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REMOTE SENSING: THE MEDIA, THE MILITARY,
AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ESTABLISHMENT-A FIRST AMENDMENT
TIME BOMB
GEORGE

E. SEAY, III*

Human law is law only by its accordance with right reason,
and by this means it is clear that it flows from Eternal law.
In so far as it deviates from right reason it is called an Unjust law; and in such a case, it is no law at all, but rather an
assertion of violence.
Saint Thomas Aquinas'
Our liberty depends on freedom of the press, and that
cannot be limited without being lost.
Thomas Jefferson 2
I like the dreams of the future better than the history of
the past.
Thomas Jefferson 3
I.

INTRODUCTION

THE MEDIA'S potential avenues for gathering information for television network news seem unlimited today.
When one thinks back to a not too distant (at least in the
scheme of history) nineteenth century when the wireless
represented a miraculous advance in the press' ability to
process and transmit information over long distances, the
* George E. Seay, III is a third-year student at Southern Methodist University

School of Law.
1 SAINT THOMAS

AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE la-2a, QXCIII (c.
2 LAURENCEJ. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME

- Id. at 156.
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fact that the media can now readily glean information
from outer space borders on the impossible. In the past
several decades the U.S. government's development of
satellite technology to do just that, collect information
from a bird's eye view in space, has improved at an impressive rate.4
Take, for example, the recent Hollywood movie "Patriot Games." Anyone who saw the film will not forget the
scene where actor Harrison Ford and several other Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staffers watched a live satellite image from Libya, where several U.S. military
special operatives killed approximately a dozen terrorists,
while the CIA group sat comfortably in a Langley, Virginia office five thousand miles away. Although pure
speculation, the belief endures that the U.S. national security apparatus controls space satellites that may not be
able to read Pravda, but at least can allow you to recognize the title on the front page. 5 The potential commercial applications of such technology, known as remotesensing satellite imagery, appear staggeringly broad. 6 EnI James. R.

Asker, Remote Sensing Sales Grow With Expanding Data Needs, AVIATION
13, 1992, at 46. See generally Rita A. Reimer, News Gathering From Space. Land Remote-Sensing and the FirstAmendment, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 321
(1988); GreggJones, High Spy: Arlington Firm Finds Market Open to Images From Russian Satellites, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 10, 1992, at DI; Mark Brender, Remarks before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Dec. 9, 1986)
(transcript available at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
5 Tony Mauro, The Puzzling Problems of Pictures From Space, WASH. JOURNALISM
REV., June, 1986, at 15, 17.
6 Jay Peterzell, Eye in the Sky, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 46.
Specific examples of the commercial potential for remote-sensing are abundant
today: remote-sensing has been used to (1) map Brazil, (2) shorten a pipeline in
Bolivia, (3) help find copper deposits in Pakistan, and (4) provide information on
WK. & SPACE TECH.,July

an earthquake in Armenia, just to name a few examples. Hamilton DeSaussure,
Remote Satellite Sensing Regulation by Nationaland InternationalLaw, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 351, 351-52 (1989).
Frequently, however, commercial potential in remote-sensing is accompanied
by potential problems, not the least of which is national sovereignty. In space, no
one can hear you scream, but additionally no one can assist a sovereign nation to
extend its tangible borders, boundaries, or demarcation lines. Several countries,
lesser developed ones in particular, have expressed concerns over how remotesensing satellites of other countries affect their sovereignty. Luc Frieden, Newsgatheringby Satellites: A New Challenge to Internationaland National Law at the Dawn of
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vironmentally related geographical studies, agricultural
studies, land management, and terrain mapping are just a
few of the more general commercial applications already
actively utilized.7
Recently, a limited commercial form of such technology
has generated a significant amount of interest in this
country and overseas: the sale of remote-sensing imagery
both to the news media for use in television broadcasts,
and to the print media for newspaper use.8 Governments
worldwide have grown increasingly concerned over several perceived threats caused by the commercial use of
this satellite imagery by the media, especially threats to
(1) national security, 9 (2) individual privacy,' 0 and (3) nation-state sovereignty." Commercial revenue from the
promulgation of satellite imagery continues to grow, so
the concerns of independent nations increase in scope as
2
access to imagery becomes more widespread.'
This paper will explore the controversies arising from
the promulgation of remote-sensing satellite imagery
technology, and will address in particular the "Pandora's
Box" that such technology may reveal in the near future.
the Twenty-First Century, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 117 (1991). This issue currently
remains unresolved in the geopolitical scheme of world affairs. Id. at 117-21.
7 Asker, supra note 4, at 51. Probably the most widespread commercial application of remote-sensing technology is geographic information systems, or GIS. Id.
at 47. "GIS is a broad term covering systems that use computer hardware and
software to manipulate and analyze a wide variety of data organized geographically." Id. The main applications of GIS are to combine all sorts of empirical data
with geographical information to solve complex global management and planning
puzzles; GIS currently represents a $5.3 billion global industry. Id. With the
growing awareness and sense of urgency over the fragile nature of our planet's
ecosystem, the utility of remote-sensing for GIS-related purposes seems only limited by how quickly the technology can be rendered practical in particular industries and scientific endeavors.
" Reimer, supra note 4, at 322; see also Joseph Vitale, Eyes in the Sky, CHANNELS:
Bus. OF COMM., Nov. 1986, at 17.
9 See Frieden, supra note 6, at 117.
10See generally Reimer, supra note 4, at 341-43.
1' Frieden, supra note 6, at 117; Reimer, supra note 4, at 341; Jeannette T.
Biondo, Problems of Remote Sensing. A Look at American Law for an Approach to Sensed
States' Demands, 9 FLETCHER F. 447, 451-53 (1985).
'2 Cynthia M. Hayward, Remote Sensing: Terrestrial Laws for Celestial Activities, 8
B.U. INT'L L.J. 157, 158 (1990); Asker, supra note 4, at 46-47.
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This "Pandora's Box," when opened, reveals a looming
struggle between the United States military and media
over the media's First Amendment right to secure all imagery possible through a remote-sensing satellite and also
to broadcast that imagery at will. In the not too distant
future, the media probably will have the capability to
broadcast such imagery after acquisition from a mediaowned and controlled satellite.' 3 The military argues vehemently that national security remains a critical exception to any media right to gather news through satellite
remote-sensing and that the military has a continuing
right to exercise "prior restraint" over remote-sensing
imagery which threatens the United States' critical strategic interests. 14 The parameters of this article will extend
only to U.S. law, as constitutional considerations have
minimal
effect
on
international
remote-sensing
deliberations. 'The article will be divided into five sections: (1) the
technological development of remote-sensing, especially
the U.S. Landsat program and the potential for a mediaowned, remote-sensing satellite commonly referred to as
See Frieden, supra note 6, at 106.
See Reimer, supra note 4, at 332-38. At the same time, the military continues
to attempt to reassure the media and general public by stating that it will impose
limitations on space news gathering only in situations which clearly threaten the
national interest. James R. Asker, Congress Considers Landsat 'Decommercialization'
Move, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 11, 1992, at 18 [hereinafter Congress
Considers].
I. It should be noted that no multilateral treaty regulating commercial remotesensing has been enacted by the United Nations or any other geopolitical organization. U.N. Resolution 41/65, "Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the
Earth From Space," represents the only tentative attempt to initiate remote-sensing regulation. Harry Feder, The Sky's the Limit? Evaluating the InternationalLaw of
Remote-Sensing, 23 INr'L L. & POL. 599, 601-02 (1991). The principles are a first
step towards international regulation of U.N. member states' remote-sensing use,
but only a first step, because the principles lack the specific content necessary to
establish a framework for more binding U.N. action in the future. DeSaussure,
supra note 6, at 357. International law in the remote-sensing field thus remains
nebulous and insubstantial. For further exploration of the international legal
question posed by remote-sensing technology, see Feder, supra; Frieden, supra
note 6, at 103; Bradley D. Gallop, The Final Frontier: A Proposed Legal Orderfor an
American Space Settlement, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715 (1987); Hayward, supra
note 12, at 157.
'

'4
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"Mediasat," (2) the historically volatile relationship between the military and the media in regard to restraints on
media coverage of military activity, from World War I until the present day, (3) the escalation of military/media
tensions in the recent Persian Gulf War, including limitation of satellite imagery, (4) a look at the media's poorly
defined, limited First Amendment right to gather news
along with the controversial "prior restraint doctrine,"
and finally, (5) a review of the potential of remote-sensing
for news gathering, coupled with policy suggestions to attempt to avoid military/media conflict over such use.
II.

THE BIRTH AND EXPONENTIAL ADVANCES IN
REMOTE-SENSING TECHNOLOGY,
GOVERNMENTALLY AND
COMMERCIALLY

Remote-sensing exists today as an extremely sophisticated form of space photography which has developed in
the last few decades. 16 In its most simplistic form, it involves the utilization of advanced photographic equipment as an appendage on the base of a satellite in low,
sun-synchronous orbitals.17 The necessary supplementary equipment, which remains in fixed positions on the
earth's surface in the form of ground relay stations, digitally records impressions of the earth's surface from the
satellite photographic transmissions and converts those
impressions into imagery. The imagery can be utilized for
several different purposes, including news gathering.' 8
16 Robert J. Aamoth, From Landsat to Mediasat: The Development of Remote-Sensing
Technology and the First Amendment Right of the Press to use that Technology for News
Gathering, 2 WASHINGTON, D.C.: NAT'L LEGAL CENTER FOR PUB. INTEREST 1-2
(1986).
17 Id. at 3. "An orbit is sun-synchronous when the spacecraft is constantly interposed between the earth and the sun. With respect to remote sensing, this type of
orbit is essential to ensure that the sensor is always looking down at the earth
during daytime when imagery can be taken." Id. at 2 n.2.
"I Reimer, supra note 4, at 323. Remote-sensing's primary use in the informa-

tional technology field consists of geological imagery of the earth's surface, both
for commercial and scientific purposes. See supra note 7 for a discussion of geographic information systems (GIS). Imagery use in news broadcasts, which was
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One difficult part of this process is developing the imagery into pictures that are clear and concise enough to
provide benefits to the purchasers for use in their varied
industries.' 9 Depending on the sophistication of the remote-sensing equipment involved, the images can be
graphically extensive and extremely detailed. 0
A.

LANDSAT'S BEGINNINGS

Originally, the government did not provide an outlet
for the commercial potential of remote-sensing technology, and all remote-sensing benefits remained unique to
the federal government. 2 ' However, with the launch of
the first Landsat satellite by NASA in 1972,22 the commercial era of remote-sensing began. 3 The only problem was
that most commercially useful aspects of remote-sensing
require fairly high resolution. While Landsat satellites initially provided resolution of eighty meters, 24 today's comnot even discussed when the technology first developed, helps illustrate just how
many undiscovered applications of this technology remain. Reimer, supra note 4,
at 323-24.
'9 See Feder, supra note 15, at 600. For instance, the media has had a difficult
time assessing the utility of some forms of remote-sensing, because such imagery
can only be recognized by experts in the field. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Commercial News GatheringFrom Space-A Technical Memorandum 23
(1987) (OTA-TM-15C-40) [hereinafter OTA Memorandum]. Media representatives agree that the more extensive the imagery is, the greater utility it has for
widespread use. Id.
20 Aamoth, supra note 16, at 2; Jones, supra note 4, at DI. Some up-to-date
commercial satellite imagery can photograph an automobile driving down the
street in Provo, Utah, or a moose herd galloping across frozen Arctic tundra.
Classified military technology is believed to be even more efficient. Mauro, supra
note 5, at 17; Jones, supra note 4, at Dl, D4.
21 With remote-sensing a relatively nascent technology in the latter twentieth
century and considering the tense geopolitical landscape of the Cold War era, it is
not overly surprising that the U.S. Government did not allow for commercial use
of the technology until well after its development.
22 Landsat began in September, 1969 as a NASA program to explore the development of satellite imagery from space and analyze its potential benefits to society
in general and the U.S. government in particular. Christopher C. Joyner & Douglas R. Miller, Selling Satellites: The Commercialization of Landsat, 26 HARV. INT'L LJ.
63, 66 (1985). NASA launched the first Landsat satellite, Landsat 1, in 1972 and
the launch of several other satellites has followed in the years thereafter. Id. at 6467.
2- Aamoth, supra note 16, at 3.
24 When resolution is described by analysts in meter measurements, what they
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mercial satellites provide up to two meter resolution. 5
Experts believe that for satellite imagery to have widespread, practical commercial use, especially for news
gathering, the images must have a minimum of five meter
resolution capability. 26 Coincidentally, or not so coincidentally, that is similar to the level of resolution believed
to threaten U.S. national security when a satellite is
pointed in the "wrong" direction. 27 The "wrong" direction refers to remote-sensing equipment pointed at a military base, a geographical region with large troop
placements, a region with a large number of naval vessels,
aircraft or types of military equipment, a nuclear weapons
facility, or another type of military installation. The key
factor remains whether the government classifies the area
as vital to national security. Supposedly, a 1979 classified
executive directive from then President Carter restricted
commercial remote-sensing to the ten meter resolution
level.28
Confusion over such issues led Congress to the realization that it needed to provide more clear direction concerning procedures for commercial application of remotesensing. Congress enacted the Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act of 1984 (Landsat Act) for this very
the continued commercialipurpose, as well as to further
29
zation of the technology.
are referring to is the size of an object which can be viewed from space with the
specific satellite system. Reimer, supra note 4, at 324. For example, eighty meter
resolution means that a viewer of the image can discern objects in the image
eighty meters or greater in size. Roughly, if a satellite has eighty meter resolution
capability, one can recognize a football field from the image. If the equipment
possesses one meter capability, one can discern a man sitting on a park bench. Id.
215 Jones, supra note 4, at D4;Joyner & Miller, supra note 22, at 65; Reimer, supra
note 4, at 324.
26 Reimer, supra note 4, at 324.
27 Joyner & Miller, supra note 22, at 65.
21 Mauro, supra note 5, at 17. Any resolution greater than ten meters theoretically had to be excluded from commercial use, due to national security implications of such precise imagery. Id. Clearly, such a directive has become hopelessly
obsolete, as the Soviets are now aggressively marketing two meter resolution imagery. Jones, supra note 4, at Dl.
29 Aamoth, supra note 16, at 6. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-92 (1988), re-
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THE LANDSAT ACT

The Landsat Act provides guidelines in an attempt to
insure a smooth transfer of many benefits of remote-sensing technology to the private sector, including allocation
of responsibility for marketing and selling the satellite imagery produced by the program. 0 One key restriction to
the program's commercialization was that U.S. national
defense and foreign policy interests had to be completely
protected by the seller and purchaser of the imagery."
The Act recognized that remote-sensing can affect U.S.
national security concerns and that even with a primary
goal of private sector responsibility for the program in the
future, "certain Government oversight must be maintained to assure that private sector activities are in the na'3 2
tional interest. 9
The Act also requires the Secretary of Commerce, as
the head of the federal agency provided with initial primary responsibility for the program, to consult with the
Secretary of Defense on all national security issues and
with the Secretary of State on all matters involving foreign
relations.3 3 The Commerce Secretary cannot issue a commercial remote-sensing license unless the use of the technology passes the Department of Defense's test for
national security and the Department of State's test for
maintaining proper foreign relations.3 4
pealed by, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 4, 106 Stat. 4166 (1992) (codified at U.S.C.A.
§§ 5601-72 (West Supp. 1993)).
so See Douglas A. Doetsch, Legal and Foreign Policy Implications of the Landsat Commercialization Act, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1985).
3S Joyner & Miller, supra note 22, at 71. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4292

(1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 15 C.F.R. § 960.1-16 (1991).
32 15 U.S.C. § 4201(4), (13) (1988), repealed by, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 4, 106
Stat. 4166 (1992) (codified at U.S.C.A. §§ 5601-72 (West Supp. 1993)).
33 Id.§ 4277.
34 See id. § 4241. The problem with these "tests" to protect national security
and foreign relations is that they are never clearly defined in the Landsat Act or
any other document, and are left chiefly to the discretion of the Executive Branch,
or more specifically, the State and Defense Departments. With such vague requirements for license approval and such great discretion given to the Executive
Branch, it would not be too difficult to prevent an undesirable license applicant
from obtaining a license.
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The Act never actually provides a concrete definition of
what is meant by national security, despite national security being a critical factor in government approval of any
licensed utilization of the system by a private entity. National security represents a generic term in the Act included without much clarification as to its specific
meaning. Additionally, a congressional official claimed
that the attorneys who drafted the Act did not consider
the ramifications of media use of satellite imagery, especially from the perspective of news gathering being a
threat to national security.3 5 " 'We never looked at it in
those terms,' one congressional official [said]. 'The whole
First Amendment thing [was] an afterthought. We
smacked our heads and realized [we had] left something
out.' "36 With such naivete as to a critical element of the
national security aspects of the Act, the great concern
over the potential national security dangers of media use
of remote-sensing technology is not surprising; such concern centering on the prospects for a wholly-owned and
controlled media satellite. 7
C.

THE CLARIFICATION OF THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS,
AND FURTHER EMPHASIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
CONCERNS

Due to private sector confusion over what licensing and
regulation of remote-sensing really entailed under the
Landsat Act, the government in 1988 issued regulations
to clarify the process. 3 ' Although the government did
provide private entities interested in remote-sensing a
higher level of guidance concerning the stipulations of
commercial licensing, the term "national security" was
given continued emphasis, yet was still not satisfactorily
explained. After the first subsection of the regulations expressly affirm that national security remains a primary
35 Peterzeli,
36

supra note 6, at 46.

Id.

I Mauro, supra note 5, at 16.
Id.;
15 C.F.R. § 960.1-.16.
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purpose of the original Landsat Act, 9 the regulations
then go on to state that:
To the extent... there is a tension between the policies of
promoting the commercial use of remote-sensing systems
and the policies of promoting national security interests as
determined by the Secretary of Defense ... the Secretary
of Commerce may, in his or her discretion, undertake reasonable efforts to satisfactorily
resolve the matter in favor
40
of commercialization.
Although at face value this provides some comfort to
commercialization proponents, the terminology "reasonable efforts" seems open to different interpretations. 4 '
Later in the regulations, the government provides that the
Department of Defense, Department of State, or other
relevant federal agencies (e.g. NASA) shall have the
power to review all commercial satellite licensing applications, and shall be able to prevent any license grant until
all potential national security concerns are addressed and
satisfied by the license applicant. 42 The Defense Department, with its much larger budget and greater political
clout, will almost always prevail over the Commerce Department in disputes over whether a remote-sensing license threatens national security. Direct White House
intervention could override such a Defense Department
power play, but since matters of this nature are usually
left to the discretion of individual federal agencies, any
such White House action would be highly unlikely.
An additional factor impinging on uninhibited use of
satellite commercial imagery apart from the Landsat Act
39 Id. § 960.1 (a).
40

Id. § 960.1.

41 In these clarifying regulations, similar to the Landsat Act, the Executive

Branch has great discretion to determine whether remote-sensing imagery should
be licensed to certain commercial entities. Further, whether the Secretary of
Commerce has used reasonable efforts under 15 C.F.R. § 960.1 to promote commercialization over security concerns will be viewed differently by an ACLU lawyer on the one hand, and a Colonel in the National Security Administration (NSA)
on the other hand. Great potential for disputes remain, even after promulgation
of the regulations.
42 Id. § 960.9, 960.9(e)(l)-(2).
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or its regulations is the Espionage Act, 43 which provides
for criminal prosecution of those entities that: (1) gather
defense information which threatens national security, (2)
assist a foreign government by providing them with U.S.
national security information, (3) photograph defense-related institutions, (4) distribute or sell such photographs, or (5)
broadcast classified information. 44 Punishment for violations of the Espionage Act range from small fines and
minimal incarceration to large fines and the death penalty.45 These espionage provisions, which clearly regulate
activities that may or may not involve purposeful spying,
bestow considerable latitude on the federal government
in protecting the national interest while at the same time
impose potentially heavy restraints on commercial remote-sensing.
The key element of the Espionage Act's system for punishment of violations from this article's perspective is that
the Act includes post-broadcast sanctions alone; there is
no provision or allowance for prior restraint of broadcast
materials. Thus, the Espionage Act cannot impinge upon
First Amendment rights of news gathering or broadcasting through remote-sensing technological capabilities because it only regulates after the fact, it does not prevent
information gathering before the fact.46 The Espionage
Act discourages activity that could or does violate national
security, while at the same time allowing for the free propagation of satellite imagery by commercial entities.4 7
The vague provisions of the Landsat Act clearly demanded clarification of the satellite licensing process
through the regulations. At the same time, the continued
heavy emphasis on national security in the regulations,
combined with the severe criminal penalties provided for
in the Espionage Act, weighs against aggressive expan43 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-795 (1988).
44 Id.

4
46

Id. §§ 793-98.
Id.

47 Id.
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sion of domestic remote-sensing commercialization.
From the media's perspective, commercial satellite news
gathering could be imperiled before a satellite can even
get off the ground through a licensing process firmly controlled by the Defense Department.4 8
D.

EOSAT, SPOT, SOYUZKARTA, AND THE ACCELERATION
OF COMMERCIALIZATION

Once the Landsat Act had furnished a blueprint for the
gradual privatization of the Landsat program and clarification of the actual provisions of the Act had been provided by the regulations, 49 a commercial entity had to win
the contract to market the technology and sell the imagery. The American Earth Observing Satellite Company
(Eosat), a partnership of Hughes Aircraft and General
Electric (RCA), won the first contract and has been selling
remote-sensing imagery since the mid-1980's. 51 Eosat
currently provides imagery ranging up to a resolution of
thirty meters, which is normally of no utility in media situations."' By the end of 1994, however, Eosat plans to
have a satellite available that will provide remote-sensing
imagery with five meter resolution, a sufficient news gathering tool to effectuate widespread satellite news gathering capabilities among various media entities.52 Although
the Landsat program overseen by Eosat ran into budgetary difficulties in the last few years which threatened its
commercial and governmental viability, it seems to have
recently regained its stability through a renewed funding
commitment from former President Bush's Administra41 See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. Recently the U.S. government
transferred full oversight and licensing control over the commercialization process from the Commerce Department to the Defense Department.
49 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-92 (1988), repealed by, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 4, 106
Stat. 4166 (1992) (codified at U.S.C.A. §§ 5601-72 (West Supp. 1993)); 15 C.F.R.
§ 960.1-.16; see also supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
,- Laurie McGinley, Satellites May Give JournalistsPowerful Tool, Lead to Showdown
on National Security Issue, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1986, at 58; Reimer, supra note 4, at

323.
.1 OTA Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2.
2

Frieden, supra note 6, at 108.
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tion.53 It must remain stable in order to continue to be
commercially competitive, as commercial remote-sensing
satellites now can be found in several countries.54
One primary competitor of Eosat operates from France,
the French System Probatiore d'Observation de la Terre
(Spot). Spot offers its customers ten meter resolution,
much better than that currently provided by Eosat, and
has recently acquired several impressive new clients, including International Business Machines (IBM).55 Spot
plans to have five meter resolution available by the end of
1994, the same resolution goal held by Eosat.5 6 The only
entity now making five meter resolution or better commercially available is a Russian venture, Soyuzkarta, which
markets and distributes its remote-sensing imagery
57
through Spot.

E.

THE THREAT OF FOREIGN ADVANCES IN REMOTESENSING AND THE GROWING POSSIBILITY OF A
MEDIA SATELLITE (MEDIASAT)

1.

Foreign Advances

An issue that has recently emerged centers
if, the U.S. government can limit commercial
mote-sensing dissemination and distribution
ens national security. If Spot and Soyuzkarta

on how, or
foreign reif it threatmarket ten,

51 James R. Asker, Congress, White House Weigh Overhaul of Landsat Program, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 28, 1991, at 23.

54 Countries and coalitions now offering remote-sensing satellite imagery commercially include: the United States, France, the European Community, Japan,
Russia, India, and a handful of others.
55 Asker, supra note 4, at 47.
56 James R. Asker, Commercial Remote Sensing Faces Challenges on Three Fronts, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 13, 1992, at 53, 59 [hereinafter Commercial Remote
Sensing Faces Challenges].
.7 Id. To show how rapidly commercial remote-sensing technology is becoming
available to the general public, the Russians now aggressively market two meter
resolution imagery! Jones, supranote 4, at D4. Apparently however, Soyuzkarta is
reluctant to attempt to use such resolution capabilities over sensitive U.S. military
installations. Commercial Remote Sensing Faces Challenges, supra note 56, at 59. Seemingly, this reluctance stems from a desire to steer clear of either a diplomatic incident or possibly even an American attempt to shoot down any satellite attempting
such a bold fly-by of a sensitive U.S. installation. Id.
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five, and even two meter resolution imagery, and the government cannot regulate those entities, how then can the
government justify preventing a domestic Mediasat or
Eosat from distributing equivalent level imagery under
particular circumstances? Besides France and Russia, additional civil remote-sensing systems are springing up in
several countries across the globe.5 The negative foreign
policy implications of attempting to restrict foreign satellite imagery are not at a cursory level of review worth the
diplomatic effort involved, as the remote-sensing technology gap between the United States and other countries
continues to diminish over time.5 9 The stifling of the domestic remote-sensing industry could be the only accomplishment of domestic restrictions if foreign imagery
marketing continues unabated and accessible to the U.S.
media. 60 Experts have maintained, however, that U.S.
economic and political pressure, as well as continuing
technological and logistical constraints, will suffice to prevent foreign imagery from being a national security hindrance. 6 ' The relational aspect between the domestic and
51 See supra note 54 (listing countries with commercial remote-sensing
capabilities).
59 Attempts by the United States to bludgeon other countries into taking its
position on an issue or geopolitical event have repeatedly backfired in the past
(e.g. Japan and trade issues, the United Kingdom and the Vietnamese boat people
issue, India and intellectual property rights). Trying to limit another foreign sovereign's commercial ventures from expanding their remote-sensing capabilities
almost certainly is doomed to failure. A better approach would be to subtly suggest that foreign commercial entities restrict their satellite image gathering to regions of the globe that do not violate treaties or critical U.S. strategic and security
interests. This is a reasonable and apparently conceivable way to protect security
and ease the possiblity of diplomatic tensions at the same time. Additionally, with
the French and Russians marketing imagery with much better resolution than is
commercially available in the United States, attempts to limit propagation of foreign
imagery seem pointless; efforts could be better spent trying to improve the domestic competitive position in this fast rising industry.
60 OTA Memorandum, supra note 19, at 34.
61 Id. at 5-6. As domestic imagery is more readily accessible to U.S. media entities, and as access to and distribution of foreign remote-sensing imagery can be
limited through careful diplomatic negotiation, it seems logical that the domestic
remote-sensing industry remains the more likely candidate to be closely regulated
by the national security apparatus of the federal government. The key for the
fledgling domestic remote-sensing industry is to that insure the U.S. government
only regulates and does not stifle the industry. Furthermore, the U.S. goverment
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international remote-sensing market and any threats to
national security from the international market will simply
have to be discussed and sorted through over time.
The availability of five meter or better imagery resolution through foreign or domestic commercial sources
makes numerous Defense Department officials uncomfortable; to wit, a television national security analyst has
stated that the media "does not want to do the [United
States] harm, but if [he] were a military planner, [he]
would be quite worried. '6 2 A NASA consultant cryptically
joked that if a foreign or domestic commercial satellite
company went after imagery in the wrong global regions,
the company might "find its satellite mysteriously disabled. ' 63 Security tensions have only mounted with the
disappearance of prior technological limitations on resolution enhancement with the availability of five and even
two meter resolution from the Russians. If the media decides it needs to control such a high level of resolution
imagery itself without having to purchase it from a separate commercial entity, it may launch its own satellite.
2.

Mediasat

A media remote-sensing satellite (Mediasat) could soon
be a reality. Potential constraints on such a satellite are:
(1) government regulatory approval, (2) cost, and (3) the
utility of the technology." 4 Cost and utility stand as the
more challenging hurdles. As long as a proposed
Mediasat meets the government's initial national security
concerns and standard regulations, licensing apparently
will be no more than a technicality. As stated previshould make sure that the domestic industry's competitive position internationally
is not hopelessly undercut. Strict regulations in the interest of national security
will surely, at a minimum, threaten domestic competitiveness in the remote-sensing satellite imagery market.
62 Mauro, supra note 5, at 16; see also Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas (USAF, ret.),
Remarks before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Dec. 9, 1986)
(transcript available from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
63 Id.
- OTA Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2.
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ously, 6 5

however, the government is wary of the motives
and operational capabilities behind a media-controlled
satellite, and an apparently sound media satellite license
application could run into more government opposition
than can be foreseen on the face of the application itself.
Cost represents a nebulous and potentially more prohibitive factor than licensing stipulations. Cost estimates
for a remote-sensing media system, including two satellites and all related components and ground stations,6 6
range from fifty million dollars to nearly five hundred
million dollars, along with ten to fifteen million dollars in
yearly operational costs. 67 Keeping the actual cost near
the low end of these estimates is a necessity for any realistic venture, considering that yearly revenues from such a
satellite are uncertain. The technology and industry are
so young that no one knows the level of interest in such
imagery or what the average cost of individual imagery
68
production will be in the years to come.
Other problems threaten the utility of the technology.
Even with two satellites in geo-synchronous orbit, most
current remote-sensing technology can be stymied by
cloud cover and other atmospheric variables: no clear
skies, no pictures. 69 Additionally, remote-sensing satellites cannot hold their positions over particularly newsworthy regions of the globe and produce more than a few
images because the satellites must continue their
orbitals. 71
News organizations also must have these
images within six to eight hours for them to be of current
interest for most news programs; sometimes delays be65

See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (explaining licensing).
- Most experts believe that two satellites are mandatory for the media to have
the proper orbital coverage to access imagery in all areas of the globe. Otherwise
the system would not be efficient enough to be worthwhile, because the media, in
a remote sensing system, must pick up imagery of critical events anywhere in the
world on short notice. This kind of comprehensive global coverage cannot be
accomplished with only one satellite. Id.
61 Id.; Peterzell, supra note 6, at 48; Brender, supra note 4.
61 OTA Memorandum, supra note 19, at 11.
6'- Reimer, supra note 4, at 323.
70 Aamoth, supra note 16, at 3, n.4.
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yond this time frame occur either because of domestic security concerns, or because the ground relay stations are
located abroad and the foreign government will not release the pictures in time. 71 Obstacles to a Mediasat remain daunting, but the enthusiasm in the media grows
proportionally for such a satellite system as the cost estimates shrink.72 Cost estimates will continue to shrink as
time passes and improvements in satellite imagery progress. Mediasat has a chance to become a reality before
the dawn of the millennium.
III.

THE HISTORICAL VOLATILITY IN THE
MEDIA/MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
The parties with the greatest potential for conflict in the
growing realm of commercial remote-sensing technology
have to be the military and the media, whose relationship
has been volatile for decades. Military/media strains will
play a central role in determining how remote-sensing
technology is utilized in the future. From a commercial
perspective, it is imperative that some sort of understanding between the two entities develops as to the boundaries for use of remote-sensing technology in media
broadcasts or stories. The relationship to date has been
unpredictable both in peacetime and in war, varying in
each historical time period depending on the relative social strengths of the two entities and whether cooperation
or conflict better served their individual agendas.73
71

Reimer, supra note 4, at 323.

712Frieden, supra note 6, at 106.
73 For a more detailed analysis

of the media's historical relationship with the
military, with special emphasis on the last two decades, see Michelle D. Boydston,
Press Censorship and Access Restrictions During the Persian Gulf War. A First Amendment
Analysis, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (1982); Frank B. Cross & Stephen M. Griffin, A
Right of Press Access to United States Military Operations, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 989
(1987); David A. Frenznick, The First Amendment on the Battlefield: A Constitutional
Analysis of Press Access to Military Operations in Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf, 23
PAC. L.J. 315 (1992); Fred W. Friendly, When War Comes, Whither the First Amendment?, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 273 (1991); Howard B. Homonoff, The FirstAmendment and
National Security: The Constitutionality of Press Censorship and Access Denial in Military
Operations, 17 N.Y.U.J. Ir'L L. & POL. 369 (1985); Matthew J. Jacobs, Assessing the
Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the Persian Gulf War, 44 STAN. L. REV. 675
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A. WORLD WAR I
World War I represents the first large-scale international conflict in which the United States engaged its
young men in battle. The war not only represented a military testing ground, but also a testing ground for how the
military and media would relate in wartime. Initially, the
military precluded the media from all but an extremely
limited role in covering the conflict; news control and
censorship were widespread, especially from the battlefield sites themselves.7 4 As the war progressed, and the
U.S. military role in the war was comparatively short as
compared to the British, French, and Germans, the reporters became more and more bold, eventually visiting
front lines unescorted and gathering news as they
pleased. 75 Censorship of the reports issued by war correspondents did not vanish, however, even though access to
the battlefield became widespread. The press, despite
this ongoing censorship, achieved a gradual increase in
freedom of movement in World War 1,76 setting the stage
for the golden era of military/media relations, World War
II.
B. WORLD WAR II
The cooperation, trust, and mutual respect between the
military and the media during World War II has not been
equalled in any other U.S. conflict in this century. Once
again, widespread censorship was passively accepted by
the media, but in return, the media had complete freedom
of movement, access to military brass on the front lines
(1992); James D. Kieeger, The FirstAmendment, the Press and the U.S. Invasion of Grenada: Balancing the ConstitutionalInterests, 12 W. ST. U. L. REV. 217 (1984); Gara
LaMarche, Managed News, Stifled Views: Free Expression as a Casualty of the Persian Gulf
War, 9J. HUM. RTs. 45 (1991); Roger W. Pincus, Press Access to Military Operations:
Grenada and the Need for a New Analytical Framework, 135 PA. L. REV. 813 (1987).
74 Cross & Griffin, supra note 73, at 996.
75 Id.
76 For example, by the end of World War I correspondents had freedom of

movement with no military escort, could visit the trenches right on the front, and
even could cross-over such trenches during major Allied advances or movements.
Id. at 996.
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and in Washington, and even went along on dangerous
military operations. 7 7 In fact, the only limitation reporters had to their right to gather information was the
number of war correspondents: there were simply not
enough to cover every operation.78 The censorship the
military did impose usually was voluntary. The responsibility not to report sensitive information rested with the
individual correspondents. 79 The media followed this
policy for the simple reason that it shared the goals of the
military. Both believed the American war effort to be in
the national interest, and both believed violation of press
restrictions could endanger lives and hamper military efficiency.80 The level of trust between the two entities
would not reach such heights for the remainder of the
century.
C.

KOREA AND VIETNAM: THE GRADUAL AND THEN
RAPID EROSION OF TRUST

The Korean War started from a media perspective
much the same as World War II, with mostly voluntary
censorship of stories by the media. 8 ' Gradually the system shifted. Voluntary restrictions became too vague
which resulted in stories being printed which the high
command viewed as security violations.8 2 These voluntary restrictions were replaced by full government enacted
censorship similar to World War 1.83 Although this censorship began in strict form, it loosened as the war
progressed to stalemate at the thirty-eighth parallel in
1953. Unlike the two world wars, however, the press began to chafe at the constraints placed on its news gather77 Frenznick, supra note 73, at 319.

LaMarche, supra note 73, at 49.
Homonoff, supra note 73, at 377.
80 Cross & Griffin, supra note 73, at 999.
m1Id. at 1000.
812 Homonoff, supra note 73, at 379. To illustrate violations, the press released
information about the Army's retreat to the Naktong river too early, and revealed
the Army's arrival at several strategic locations. Id.
78

79

81 Id.
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ing capabilities which left a poor foundation for the
military/media relationship in the next American military
struggle, Vietnam.84
Vietnam represents a watershed event in American history on many levels, and one of those levels is the military/media relationship. The media had unlimited
battlefield access during the war, no domestic censorship,
and censorship in Vietnam itself remained voluntary. 5 As
a trade-off for these liberal media restrictions, the media
had to agree not to reveal sensitive aspects of military
operations, including troop movements, casualties and
like matters.8 6 The government, in effect, had acknowledged the legitimacy of what the media had to do in Vietnam: provide the American people with visual access to
the conflict in Southeast Asia so as to disclose the nature
of the conflict our military engaged in with the
Vietnamese. 7
Unfortunately for future military/media relations, the
combination of media misgivings about the purpose of
the war, media doubts concerning the accuracy of the information it received from the military, negative stories
heard consistently on the evening news, and military belief that the media could not be trusted and was, in effect,
an additional adversary, led to a fallout in the relationship. 8 In short, the military to a large degree believed,
and some still believe today, that the media lost the Vietnam War through the destruction of American domestic
support.8 9 The media both during and following Vietnam
took a more independent, less trustworthy stance toward
the U.S. government and military. This stance lead to rip84

Id. at 1001.

8-5Homonoff, supra
86 Id.

note 73, at 379.

87

Cross & Griffin, supra note 73, at 1002.

88

Id.

LaMarche, supra note 73, at 50. "The guys who are general[s] today were
majors and colonels in Vietnam and they were the ones who hated the press
most." Jacobs, supra note 73, at 676 (citing Neil A. Lewis, Government's Strict Orders
Limit Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at AI I (quoting Winant Sidle, the last
U.S. military spokesperson in Saigon during the Vietnam War)).
89
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pie effects in later military/media relations that no one
could have predicted at the time.90
D.

GRENADA AND PANAMA: THE AFTERSHOCK OF THE
VIETNAM WAR ERA AND FURTHER EROSION OF

MILITARY/MEDIA RELATIONS

The legacy of the fallout in the military/media relationship which arose in the Vietnam War first appeared in
"Operation Urgent Fury," the invasion of the island of
Grenada. The Grenada operation only endured for military purposes for two days. Although a colossal press
gathering arrived in nearby Barbados immediately following public realization that the military had implemented a
liberating invasion of Grenada, the media had no access
to the island until the fighting ended, and even then, the
government at first only allowed seven reporters to land
on the island. 9 ' Journalists who attempted to circumvent
the ban and arrive on the island themselves were intercepted by the Pentagon. A few were even detained incommunicado by the Navy for an extended time.92 Broad
press access to Grenada did not occur until a week after
the attack itself, and by then the novelty of the invasion
had grown stale. 93 The main justifications the Reagan Administration gave for the prolonged exclusion of press
members from the theatre of operations was the need for
surprise and the military's inability to insure the media's
safety. 94 Considering reporters were along for D-Day and
numerous other operations of far greater danger and importance, these justifications lack substantial merit. 95 A
subsequent lawsuit, Flynt v. Weinberger,96 challenged the
military's restrictive access policies in Grenada, but failed
- Cross & Griffin, supra note 73, at 1003.
91 Id. at 1004.

LaMarche, supra note 73, at 51.
93 Cross & Griffin, supra note 73, at 1005.
914Frenznick, supra note 73, at 323 n.56.
95 Homonoff, supra note 73, at 400-01.
96 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
92
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on grounds of mootness. 97 From the military's perspective, a lesson had been learned by the damage the media
had caused to the war effort in Vietnam. Such damage
would not be allowed to recur in any later conflict, beginning with Grenada.
After a post-Grenada commission recommended the
creation of a press pool to both grant and control media
access to military operations, 98 the 1989 Panama invasion
presented an almost immediate opportunity to test the effectiveness of this and other commission recommendations. The official press pool arrived in Panama scant
hours after the fighting had begun, but only had access to
actually gather news concerning the operation the day after the invasion had begun, long after the pool's arrival. 99
97 Id. at 135. In Flynt, Larry Flynt, the publisher of Hustler magazine, brought a
suit against Caspar Weinberger individually and as Secretary of Defense for the
limited access the press had to the Grenadan theatre. Id. at 135. Flynt and the
other plaintiffs appealed to the D.C. Circuit for injunctive and declaratory relief,
claiming that their First Amendment right to gather news near the battlefront had
been violated by the military's restrictions on the free movement of the press, and
urged the court to preclude the military from further restricting their movements
in covering the conflict. Id. The court, in a terse opinion, affirmed the district
court's denial of the plaintiff's claim by ruling that the controversy had been rendered moot by the short duration of the conflict, and declared that injunctive and
declaratory relief, if ever appropriate, had been overtaken by the rapid flow of
events. Id. The court's dismissal of the case is a disappointing result from the
standpoint of clarifying the media's First Amendment right to gather news in certain situations, a constitutional issue which the Supreme Court itself has never
clarified completely. See infra notes 123-50 and accompanying text. Determining
the parameters of the media's constitutional right to gather news will be an important inquiry for determining how effective a remote-sensing satellite can be as a
tool for news gathering from outer space. The Flynt court's refusal to rule on the
issue leaves its resolution for another case at another time.
9, Frenznick, supra note 73, at 324. The commission was headed by retired Major General Winant Sidle to attempt to review and to repair any damage done to
the military/media relationship by the lack of access to Grenada and heavyhanded
military control of the Grenadan theatre. LaMarche, supra note 73, at 51. The
makeup of the commission was bereft of any members of the major media bodies,
who claimed it would be a conflict of interest on their part to participate. Id. The
effectiveness of the commission's determinations, which included the establishment of a Department of Defense Media Pool and the encouragement of voluntary press cooperation in preventing the publication of sensitive military
information, was questioned at the time and was to be further tested in the next
two major military actions, the deposition of Manuel Noriega of Panama, and the
attempted deposition of Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Id.
Frenznick, supra note 73, at 325.
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The military did not provide needed transportation, prevented non-pool reporters from arriving and generally
delayed extensive press access to the field of operations
until the critical fighting had already taken place.' 0 0 The
military had once again disrupted the media's effectiveness through delay and lack of cooperation. The military
muzzling of the media in Grenada and Panama, regardless
of questions of intentionality, was, in retrospect, fairly
predictable considering the lingering bad memories the
military carried from its relationship with the media in
Vietnam, and from the mutual distrust in the relationship.' 0 1 Following those two conflicts came the. critical
conflict, both from the perspective of its recent nature and
its implications for remote-sensing, the Persian Gulf War.
IV.

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND LIMITATIONS
ON NEWS GATHERING

Unhappily, considering the massive strains imposed on
the military/media relationship in Grenada (Flynt v.
Weinberger) 0 2 and Panama, the situation took a turn for
the worst in the Persian Gulf War. 03 The media went
into the war with a major handicap in regard to its ability
to exercise its right to gather news: following Vietnam,
Grenada, and Panama, the majority of the American people had come to agree with the military that the press was
at times irresponsible and inaccurate, and also not to be
fully trusted or respected in its coverage of U.S. military
engagements. 0 4 In the Gulf War,
100Id.
101 The

conclusions and recommendations of the Sidle Commission thus produced no practical results or strides forward in the military/media relationship
during the Panama invasion. LaMarche, supra note 73, at 52.
102 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see supra notes 96-97.
"), The tense nature of the relationship can be illustrated well by the margin of
error for each group: "[W]hen the military makes a mistake, people die. When
the press errs, it prints a correction on page 3." Jacobs, supra note 73, at 691
n.108. Such an overwhelming difference in the repercussions from mistakes
among the two groups cannot help bui lead to tension. The military is under a far
greater level of pressure to avoid mistakes.
,-4 In June, 1992, only 31% of the American people believed television report-
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for the first time . . . the public was able to witness the

bitter, contentious struggle between the military spokespersons seeking to guard operational secrets and zealous
reporters trying to meet deadlines and placate editors.
Viewers saw reporters asking naive, rude or repetitive
questions, and "jostling for whatever tiny flakes of fame
[which might] settle on their shoulders like some Pulitzer
Prize dandruff."' 5
The incompetent reporters 0 6 who asked the inapproers to have high or very high ethical standards, and only 25% believed newspaper
reporters to have high or very ethical standards. Leslie McAneny, Pharmacists
Again Top "Honesty and Ethics" Poll; Ratingsfor Congress Hit New Low, GALLUP POLL
MONTHLY, July 1992, at 2. Comparatively, the average percentage of people expressing a great deal or "quite a lot" of confidence in the print and television
media in March, 1991 through October, 1991 was 34.5% and 28% respectively.
George Gallup and Frank Newport, M.D., Confidence in Major U.S. Institutions at Alltime Low, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Oct. 1991 at 36-37. On the average, 77% of the
public during the same period expressed a great deal or quite a lot of confidence
in the military, making the military the institution holding the highest level of the
public confidence. Id. at 37; see also LaMarche, supra note 73, at 62; Sydney H.
Schanberg, CensoringforPolitical Security, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 1991, at 23;
John Benson, People Criticize News Media, but Value the News, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 1991, at 19.

105Jacobs, supra note 73, at 676 (quoting Henry Allen, The Gulf Between Media
and Military, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at D 1).At the time of the Gulf War, to
further illustrate popular approval of both military behavior and resistance to media behavior in press briefings, 78% of Americans believed that the military was
informing the public of any relevant information it could without endangering

lives or national security, and 79% approved of the military's use of censorship in
the distribution of war information. Jacobs, supra note 73, at 676 n.9 (citing Alex
S. Jones, Poll Backs Control of News, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1991, at C24).
-0At the time of the Gulf War, the United States had not been in a full-scale
extended military engagement since Vietnam, nearly two decades earlier.
Although the military almost certainly performed their tasks to a higher level of
proficiency than they did in that prior conflict, the same cannot be said of the
media. Years of peacetime had left military issues, strategies and weaponry a poor
candidate for primetime television news until the war, and the quality of reporting
and knowledge of day to day military matters revealed in that reporting suffered
as a result. See generally John T. Correll, Nitwitness News, A.F. MAG., Apr., 1991, at 6
(discussing the media's performance during the Gulf War); Letters to the Editor,
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1991, at A18 (commenting on the media in the Gulf War);
Special Transcript: Inside Washington (television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1991) (commenting on the the media and national affairs in general); Henry Allen, The Gulf Between

Media and Military; In Briefing Room Skirmishes, The Officers Score a Lopsided Victory,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at DI (raising the opinion that the military outperformed the media during the Gulf War). "Competent reporters do not ask for
troop movements, plans for attacks or operational information. Should an incompetent reporter blunder into such questions, he is quickly stiff-armed. Even so,
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priate and belligerent questions in the Gulf War spoiled
the broth, so to speak, from a public relations standpoint
for the rest of the media professionally performing their
jobs during the war. The relative unpopularity of the media, coupled with the heightened tension with the military,
definitely could carry over from the Gulf War to disrupt
the smaller realm of remote-sensing. News gathering by
remote-sensing, which the military limited to a substantial
degree to military use alone during the war, was one activ0 7
ity specifically affected by these tensions.
A.

LIMITATIONS ON MEDIA ACTIVITIES DURING THE GULF
WAR AND THE DANGERS OF MILITARY POWER TO
ENFORCE SUCH LIMITATIONS

Restrictions on news gathering during the Gulf War
were widespread, extremely prohibitive and to a large degree unchallenged because of the military's titanic popularity. First, the military prohibited the release of specific
numerical information relating to weapons, supplies,
troops and equipment. 0 8 Second, information concerning future plans, operations or strikes remained under
lock and key.' 0 9 Most importantly from this article's perspective, the military banned the gathering of information
through satellite photography and imagery that related to
military security, troop strength and location of various
military forces."l0 The military also imposed several other
specific restrictions. Although national security concerns
apparently justified most of these restrictions, the passivtelevision magnifies their mistakes. Viewers cringe, and perhaps understandably,
generalize." Jacobs, supra note 73, at 676 n.6 (quoting Combat and Combative Reporters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1991, at A28). Additionally, military briefers fre-

quently ran circles around their media counterparts in many a briefing session
because the military staffers were better prepared and much more knowledgeable
about the subject matter being discussed. John T. Correll, Witness News, A.F.
MAG., Apr. 1991, at 6.
107 Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1580
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
108Id.
10' Id.
110 Id.
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ity of the media during the war apparently allowed the
prohibition on news gathering to extend too far."' Almost no one would dispute that publication of satellite remote-sensing imagery revealing certain military activities
during the war would have impeded the coalition effort
and breached national security. During the war, however,
the military seemed to be drawing on the powerful approval of the American public and the mostly unchallenged restraints it placed on the media in Grenada and
on
Panama to unilaterally and omnipotently clamp down
2
much of the media's news gathering capability."
If this trend which has been building ever since Grenada continues unabated, it raises alarming questions because the power of restraint enables the military to
significantly impair media activity by falsely crying national security or war necessity instead of crying wolf, like
was done instead in the past. Public approval can be a
dangerous asset when wielded aggresively, and one of the
dangers illustrated in the Gulf War was the military's level
of discretion to impair media news gathering." 3 The military seems destined to abuse its ability to restrict media
news gathering unless more concrete standards of when
such restrictions are proper can be established by either
joint agreement between the military and media or by an
objective, non-partisan, quasi-judicial body.

I

See generally Howard Kurtz, Journalists say "Pools" Don't Work, Lack of Access
Hampers Coverage, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1991, at AI (discussing media complaints
about the press pool system set up by the Sidle Commission following the
Grenadan conflict); Jacobs, supra note 73.
111See generally Paul Hoversten, Press, Military Clash off Camera, USA TODAY, Feb.
7, 1991, at AI (commenting on military/media tensions in the Gulf War); Barbara
Reynolds, Truth Takes Holiday From The Gulf War, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 1991, at A7
(stating the opinion that the military abused its control over the media in the Gulf
War); Jacobs, supra note 73.
I's One need only look to Adolph Hitler's Germany, Saddam Hussein's Iraq or
Emperor Hirohito's Japan to see how much a nation's people can suffer when an
overwhelmingly popular government leads its nation down the wrong path, espe-

cially a path of aggression.
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Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense

1.

Following the war, the media brought an action to challenge the military's broad-based restraint of its access to
the battlefield. In Nation Magazine,' 14 the plaintiff press
members" 5 asserted that they were not challenging the
military's right to protect legitimate national security level
information, they were instead contesting the military's
grant of only limited battlefield access to the media. The
trial court stated that because the First Amendment right
of freedom of the press was a serious issue, that it was
loath to hear any case involving the First Amendment unless the issue in the particular case was clearly defined,
which it was not in Nation Magazine." 6 The court quickly
determined that any claim for injunctive relief was moot,
as the restrictions on press movements in the Middle East
removed by the time the district court
had long since been
7
heard the suit.''
The harder question was whether to grant the plaintiffs
declaratory relief, which was still feasible. Judge Sand
ruled that the court should refrain from "evaluating a set
of regulations that are currently being reviewed for possible revision, to determine their reasonableness in the context of a conflict that does not exist and the precise
contours of which are unknown and unknowable."' " The
court wanted such a serious constitutional issue decided
only when it existed in a "clean-cut and concrete
form."" 9 In Nation Magazine the issue was not clear-cut
had concluded,
because the conflict that led to the lawsuit
20
and so the court dismissed the case.1
14

762 F. Supp. at 1561.

15 None of the major dailies, weeklies or networks decided to join the plaintiffs
in the suit, believing the chances of a successful lawsuit were slender.
I o Id. at 1562.

Id. at 1570.
- Id. at 1575.

H7

119 Id.
120 Nations Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575. The Nation Magazine case was strikingly similar to Flynt. Both plaintiffs were media members prohibited from full
access to the battlefield in military campaigns, and both sought injunctive and
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Even though the trial court dismissed the Nation Magazine case, the fact that a second First Amendment case involving news gathering in a wartime setting (Flynt was the
first) could develop and proceed to trial illustrates the
military/media tension. The way the case concluded
leaves the military stranglehold on media news gathering
rights seemingly intact for the current time. The potential
for the military in particular and the U.S. government in
general to abuse its apparent ability to restrict press activity looms ominously for the future of remote-sensing. If
the military restricted ground level news gathering in the
desert as well as stratospheric level news gathering from
satellites with remote-sensing image resolution between
ten and thirty meters, the military's reaction to a five
meter resolution Mediasat circling above a secret military
installation, passing over a critical logistical area in an active military operation, or attempting to monitor U.S.
compliance with a nuclear weapons treaty will be explosive, and aggressively geared to eliminate press access to
such information. It appears a ready conclusion that the
military and media need to either determine for themselves, or have a court determine for them, what exactly
are the parameters of the media's First Amendment right
to gather news, and what exactly constitutes the military's
right to promote the national interest and to guard
against violations of national security.
V. THE MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
GATHER NEWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS THERETO
The recent heightened tension between the military
and media seems to portend poorly for avoidance of military/media conflict in the remote-sensing field in the upcoming years. The media remains keen on the idea of
launching its own news gathering satellite, while the milideclaratory relief. The court referred to Flynt several times in its argument. Id. at
1562, 1569-70.
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tary and defense establishment, as evidenced by the recent Gulf War, appears confident in its ability to prevent
the flow of information when it perceives the need to do
so. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or the

press.

12

The difficulty of the First Amendment remains

in applying the broad provisions of the passage and their
implications to twentieth century circumstances, such as
media news gathering from remote-sensing satellites,
many miles above the earth's surface. The founding fathers could not have fathomed a man-made device travelling many miles above the earth's surface and producing
images of the earth, images which the media could use to
report the news. Although the Supreme Court has never
ruled specifically on the constitutional status of news
gathering through remote-sensing satellites, 122 there have
been several cases which have loosely defined the parameters of the media's right to explore potential news sources
through information collection.
A.

BRANZBURG V. HAYES

The Supreme Court's central decision analyzing the status of news gathering remains Branzburg v. Hayes, 123 a
1972 case in which the Court analyzed whether a reporter
had to answer a grand jury subpoena and respond to
questions relating to sources the reporter had acquired in
a criminal investigation.124 The key issue the Court addressed was whether "the burden on news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to disclose confidential
information outweigh[ed] any public interest in obtaining
the information" in a grand jury setting. 25 The Court, in
121

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

Although there are no Supreme Court decisions directly relevant to this inquiry, if there were they would have to have been decided in the last few decades,
as remote-sensing technology has only been commercially available since the early
1970's.
122

123408
124 Id.
125

U.S. 665 (1972).

Id. at 681-82.
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an opinion by justice White, did "not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country's
welfare.' 12 6 Nor did "it suggest that news gathering [did]
not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated."'127 The Court went on to state,
however, that "it is clear that the First Amendment does
not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press ....
The prevailing view is that the press is not free to publish
[or withhold] with impunity everything and anything it
2
desires to publish [or withhold]."'
The Court expounded on this theme of limitations on
the media's right to gather news by stating that "the First
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional
right of special access to information not available to the
public generally."' 2 9 Justice White gave several examples
of situations in which the press was properly excluded
from gathering information for news distribution or publication: (1) grand jury proceedings, (2) Supreme Court
deliberations, (3) meetings of private organizations, (4)
scenes of a crime, and (5) general disasters from which
the public is denied access. 30 The Court's specific holding clearly set out that the media's right to gather news
and to withhold or publish any information thus acquired
was subservient to the public's right to see that 'media
members gave full disclosure to grand juries in criminal
proceedings, regardless of any confidential sources of the
media.' 3 ' In a more general sense the Court has never
held that news gathering should warrant the same level of
protection, or the same exalted constitutional status, as
32
traditional speaking or publishing activities.
126

Id.

128

Id. (emphasis added).
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682, 683.

129

Id. at 684.

127

'so Id.

is' Id. at 690.
1 2 OTA Memorandum, supra note 19, at 35. Freedom to speak and freedom to
publish information or express editorial commentary are fundamental liberties inherently necessary to a democratic society, and fittingly are given absolute protec-
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At first blush the decision in Branzburg bodes poorly for
the media's ability to gather news through remote-sensing
satellites, at least from an absolutist First Amendment
standpoint. Clearly, the general public does not have access to information gleaned from photographic equipment mounted onto the base of a satellite. The Court
states that unless the public can also access such information, the media does not have a3 3superseding, absolute
right to gather it in all situations.
B.

PELL V. PROCUNIER, SAXBE V. WASHINGTON POST CO.,

& HOUCHINS v. KQED

Pell v. Procunier'34 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,135
companion 1974 cases, remain the only decisions to address directly the constitutional status of news gathering. ' 36 The cases both involved challenges to regulations
prohibiting the media from interviewing specific inmates
in state or federal prisons. The Court followed its reasoning in Branzburg in both cases by holding that because the
general public had no right of access to individual prisoners, save for relatives, ministers, attorneys and like persons, that the media had no First Amendment right to
gather news from specific inmates.' 37 The regulations
limiting press access to randomly selected inmates in both
cases had a primary purpose of maintaining order in prisons, a legitimate correctional goal. "In the expert judgment of [penal officials], . . . hostility and resentment
[would have resulted] among inmates who were refused
tion under the Constitution.

U.S. CONST. amend. I. The freedom to gather

information, however, no matter what the location, circumstance, or type of information involved, is not. An unlimited right to gather information wherever and
however the press sees fit would lead to a chaotic society, and the Supreme Court,
recognizing the lesser importance of this right, has placed limitations, on it in
Branzburg and the cases mentioned infra, notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
"'3

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684.

'14 417

U.S. 817 (1974).

417 U.S. 843 (1974).
136Reimer, supra note 4, at 329.
37 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834.
135
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interview privileges granted to their fellows."'' 38 "The
proposition 'that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists
sources of information not available to members of the
public generally ... finds no support in the words of the
Constitution or in any decision of this Court.' ,,139 The
media had no right of special access not shared by the
general public.
The Court affirmed Pelt and Saxbe four years later in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc. ,140 a case in which a sheriff prohibited a local radio station from entering certain areas of his
jail, photographing any parts of the jail, or interviewing
any of the inmates. The Court reiterated the argument of
Pell and Saxbe: the media had no right of access to the jail
to gather news beyond any right enjoyed by the general
public to so enter the jail. 14 1 Although dissenters raised
the argument that no access at all had been allowed in
Houchins, differentiating the case from its cited predecessors, the majority rejected that argument, upholding the
42
media's lack of access to the jail.
The public importance of conditions in penal facilities and
the media's role of providing information afford no basis
for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or
the media to enter those institutions, gather information,
and take pictures for broadcast purposes. The First
Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to
sources of information within government control.' 43
Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849.
-1 Id. at 850 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974)).
140 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
141Id. at 2.
'31

142

Id.

Id. Presumably, information within government control could include imagery gleaned from satellites utilizing remote-sensing technology; because at any
time, if the government feels that the commercial entity holding the license has
violated its license, the government can halt information gathering, revoke the
license, and seize imagery which "violates" the license granted. 15 C.F.R.
§ 960.14-.16.
14.
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RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS INC. V.

GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR
COURT

In Zemel v. Rusk 144 the Supreme Court did not address
media news gathering as a constitutional issue. The case
involved the State Department's rejection of a U.S. citizen's application for validation of his passport for travel
to Cuba, and his contention of the decision. Chief Justice
Warren's opinion, however, discussed compelling reasons
to limit any right to gather information:
[T]o the extent that the Secretary [of State]'s refusal to
validate passports for Cuba acts as an inhibition, (and it
would be unrealistic to assume that it does not), it is an
inhibition of action. There arefew restrictions on action which
could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased
dataflow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized
entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his
opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does
not make entry into the White House a First Amendment
not carry with it the
right. The right to speak and publish does
45
1
information.
gather
to
right
unrestrained
The Supreme Court in Pell and Houchins quoted the
above passage from Zemel approvingly, illustrating clearly
that news gathering by the media or any other entity or
individual will be given some First Amendment protection, but not the same level of protection given to traditional publishing or speaking activities. 146 It appears that
the Supreme Court will grant news gathering by commercial satellites or a media-controlled Mediasat some level of
constitutional protection, but just how much remains
open to speculation.
The constitutional status of news gathering became
- 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
'46 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834 n.9 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16-17); Houchins, 438
U.S. at 12. See generally supra note 127.
145
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murkier still in Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia 147 and
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.' 48 The Supreme
Court in both cases held that both the media and general
public had a right of access and a right to gather news in
the courtroom during criminal trials. ' 49 The Globe Newspaper Court specifically stated that exclusion from access to
government affairs could only be upheld upon illustration
of a "compelling government interest."''

50

A key distinc-

tion between Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper on
one hand and Branzburg and Pell on the other, apparently
lies in the fact that the general public does have access to
a criminal court and the proceedings therein, while it does
not enjoy similar access to a prison. These cases emphasize that the media's right to gather news will depend on
what the facts are in each particular case and what exactly
the media attempts to investigate.
As the Court currently interprets the First Amendment
following Branzburg, there are definite limitations on news
gathering. Exactly to what extent the Court would allow
limitations on the media's news gathering right in the
context of remote-sensing remains to be seen, as no case
law addressing remote-sensing currently exists. Comparing access to prisons, jails, and courtrooms (Branzburg,
Pell, Saxbe, Houchins) to access to remote-sensing satellite
imagery is a rather inexact pursuit. The two categories
are so different as to render any projections on how the
Court would rule on a remote-sensing case as "shots in
the dark." One can only say that the Court will have to
look at the precedent laid out in Branzburg, Pell, Saxbe,
Houchins and the few other cases which represent the
Court's only venture into ruling on the constitutional status of news gathering. The general limitations on news
gathering present the government in general and the military in particular with the opportunity to preclude broad147448 U.S. 555 (1980).
148457 U.S. 596 (1982).

Id. at 610-11; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579-80.
-5- Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
'49
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cast of remote-sensing imagery before it actually airs,
instead of imposing sanctions after the fact, under the Espionage Act for instance. The chief rationale used to impose these restrictions would be as exceptions to the
doctrine of prior restraint.
VI. PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE AND
WITHHOLDING SATELLITE PICTURES
Any government attempt to prevent the media from airing remote-sensing satellite imagery would involve prior
restraint of that information before actual broadcast. A
consistent theme in Supreme Court constitutional adjudication remains that prior restraint of the media's right to
gather and broadcast information "comes to the Court
with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity."' 5 Several arguments favoring the prior restraint
doctrine are: prior restraints (1) shut off expression
before it has a chance to be heard; (2) require adjudication in the abstract; (3) improperly affect audience reception of messages; and (4) unduly extend the state's power
into the individual's sphere of action. 52 The general public holds a higher level of disdain for prior restraints of
information, because such restraints allow information to
be withheld before the fact, instead of simply punishing
improper disclosure after the fact, as may be accomplished through sanctions. The difficulty with the doctrine remains in its inconsistent application in the
Supreme Court, 53 leaving uncertainty as to when prior
restraint may be constitutionally utilized by a government
entity.
'5, Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984) (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). As the Redish article affirms, this point of view
has been termed the "prior restraint doctrine."
152 Id. at 59.
151 See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text.
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THE GENESIS OF CONFUSION

The Supreme Court first addressed potential exceptions
to the prior restraint doctrine in Near v. Minnesota.1 54 Near
was a 1931 case involving a Minnesota law permitting the
prevention of publication of printed information which
the state believed to be a nuisance. In dicta, the Court
discussed an exception to the strong prohibition against
prior restraint of printed material:
[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized
only in exceptional cases:
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and
that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports
or the number and location of troops.55
Unfortunately for the attempts to solve the remote-sensing constitutional question, that remains the only statement by the Court on what would constitute a national
security exception to the prior restraint doctrine. A lot
has happened socially and technologically since 1931: the
U.S. has developed and placed several types of nuclear
weapons into its military arsenal, put a man on the moon,
and created literally thousands of additional technological
marvels. The Near standard is hopelessly inadequate.
The establishment of the national security exception in
Near cannot provide appropriate guidance as to what constitutes a national security threat today. Chief Justice
Hughes, who wrote the opinion in Near, could not possibly have imagined the horrifying prospect of our country
facing a senile Deng Xiao Peng' 56 of China with an inter154

283 U.S. 697 (1931).

INd. at 716 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
156 Although the Soviet (now Russian) nuclear threat has diminished considerably following diplomatic triumphs of recent years (including the recent, tentative
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continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of ending
thirty million lives at his fingertips. Although obviously
the above represents a partially inaccurate state of affairs
in today's geopolitical strata, the prospects of a similar
scenario involving a third world country with nuclear
weapons is not too far fetched, or even worse, may be in
our immediate future. 57 Remote-sensing technology
could gather imagery from U.S. military installations at a
time of global crisis, such as one resembling the sketchy
scenario above. At such a time, would the U.S. military
have a right to exercise prior restraint over such imagery
before it appears on the six-thirty news, revealing to Deng
of China or Moammar Qadaffi of Libya exactly what critical U.S. military bases are doing to meet the potential
threat? Under the frightening scenario that has been outlined above, almost assuredly yes. However, with the
hopelessly inadequate standard of Near, predictions of
constitutionality are just that, predictions. One positive
aspect of a potential constitutional challenge to a militarily imposed prior restraint on a remote-sensing satellite
image is that the Supreme Court would issue to the public
and private sector an updated, more comprehensive statement of what generally will entail a national security exception to the prior restraint doctrine, both in war and in
peacetime. Until then, the Near standard develops more
questions than it answers.
Start II Agreement), many Third World nations, including communist North Korea, are believed to possess or be close to possessing nuclear weapons of some
sort. Additionally, the People's Republic of China (PRC) remains a hopelessly
unpredictable factor in world affairs, especially considering Deng, the octogenarian leader of the PRC, is almost ninety years old. In comparison, many Americans were concerned about President Reagan's age while he was in office, and he
never even reached his eightieth birthday while serving as President.
157 In addition to the PRC and North Korea, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, India, Argentina, and a handful of other nations are all widely believed to already hold or be
close to a nuclear capability of some sort.
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NEW YORK TIMES Co. V. UNITED STATES, UNITED
STATES V. PROGRESSIVE, & UNITED STATES V.
MARCHETTI

The most famous prior restraint decision remains New
York Times Co. v. United States,' 58 better known as the Pentagon Papers Case, which involved an attempt by the Pentagon to exercise prior restraint over a classified paper
discussing the Vietnam War. The Court, in a 6-3 per
curiam opinion, held that the military could not prevent
publication of the paper by the New York Times and
Washington Post.' 9 The paper had already been widely
circulated, which clearly influenced the Court's decision.' 6 ° Justice Stewart's opinion, which Justice White
joined, seems to be the clearest exposition of a modern
day national security exception on the record. Stewart asserted that "the maintenance of an effective national defense require[s] confidentiality and secrecy."' 6 ' He later
stated that the Executive Branch must have "confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of
international relations and national defense."' 62 Stewart
concluded that to authorize Executive Branch prior restraint, disclosure must seriously threaten "direct, immedi63
ate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."'
Unfortunately, Justice Stewart's views cannot have as
compelling an impact as would be necessary to establish a
clear national security exception, because only Justice
White joined in his opinion.'6 4
151 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

Id. at 714.
Id. at 723 n.3. Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion that numerous uncontrolled copies of the document in question had been freely distributed
to the public and that the information in the papers was historical, and not of
current scientific value.
161 Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
1. Id. (emphasis added).
-1 Stewart's views, although not binding, have been cited by the Court in later
cases and are the most widely accepted statement of a general scenario which
could lead to the imposition of a constitutionally valid prior restraint. See supra
note 163 and accompanying text.
'I
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United States v. The Progressive, Inc.' 65 stands as the primary case clarifying what would entail a modem day national security exception to the prior restraint doctrine.
In Progressive, the military successfully prevented a magazine from publishing detailed information regarding the
construction of a hydrogen bomb. The court accepted
the government's argument that in some instances, especially those mandated by Justice Stewart's "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" test, the government must
have a right to exercise prior restraint over media publication of information damaging to national security.' 66 The
key element of the court's analysis was the strong case of
grave harm to the United States or harm to its vital interests through publication of the article. Following the conclusion logically flowing from its own analysis, the court
granted a preliminary injunction over the subject matter
of the article.' 67 The analysis of the court eventually had
no practical effect and the injunction became moot after
publication of the article in other periodicals. The Justice
Department did not choose to pursue the later publishers
of the article.' 68
Another case, United States v. Marchetti,169 illustrates well
the inherent confusion in the poorly defined national security exception to the prior restraint doctrine. Marchetti
was a CIA staffer, and following his employment at the
Agency he decided to write a book detailing his work.
The CIA brought suit to enjoin publication of the book,
and a district court granted the injunction. 70 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's injunction grant by stating that: (1) "nothing
in the Constitution requires the government; to divulge
information;"'17 1 (2) the government can protect its inter165

'167

""
170

'71

467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1000.
Reimer, supra note 4, at 336.
466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1316.
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nal security and communications where "disclosure may
reasonably be thought to be inconsistent with the national interest"' 72 ; and (3) "the risk of harm from disclosure is so
great and maintenance of the confidentiality of the information so necessary that . . . prior restraints . . .are
' 73
approvable."'
The Marchetti decision by Chief Justice Haynsworth of
the Fourth Circuit represents an expansion of the national
security exception far beyond the Pentagon Papers standard set up primarily by Justice Stewart in New York Times.
Judge Haynsworth asserted that the publication need only
potentially threaten national security, as opposed to both
Justice Stewart's view that publication must seriously, immediately, and certainly threaten national security, and
other justices' views in dicta in New York Times that prior
restraint is never proper under any circumstances. 74 The
Marchetti court in effect uses an ad hoc balancing test to
decide whether to recognize a national security exception
to the prior restraint doctrine: does the government interest in national security outweigh the competing media
interest in publication? 75 The lighter test imposed in
Marchetti leads to a limited presumption that the courts
may accept a national security exception in more instances, especially since the Supreme Court refused to accept certiorari in the case. 76 Such an ad hoc test would
make it much simpler for the military to exercise prior
restraint over media satellite imagery because the military
would only have to prove the possibility of a threat to national security, not the certainty of a threat.
The cases dealing with the national security exception
to the prior restraint doctrine cover the entire spectrum
I7
Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1317; Sherrie Bennett, The Broadeningof the Pentagon Papers Standard: An
Impermissible Misapplicationof the National Security Exception to the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 123, 132 (1980).
A74 York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart,J., concurring); id. at 714-24 (Black
New
'73

& Douglas, JJ., concurring).
'75 Bennett, supra note 173, at 132.
171;Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1309.
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of viewpoints. Justice Black and other justices in New York
Times would have overruled prior restraint in all cases,
while Chief Justice Haynsworth in Marchetti would have
accepted prior restraints when publication only might
harm the national interest. How this broad range of views
would apply in a future Supreme Court hearing a challenge to military prior restraint of the media's use of remote-sensing imagery remains open to speculation. As is
the case with the. news gathering issue, there are simply
no cases addressing the national security exception to the
prior restraint doctrine in the context of remote-sensing.
Popular opinion currently favors military discretion over
any absolute right of the media to gather news, 17 7 the
makeup of the Court has swung sharply, if not decisively
towards an ideologically conservative composition in recent years, and national security becomes harder to define
with each increase in technology, especially in weaponry.
One point stands out: the problem with national security threats in general, and remote-sensing national security threats in particular, would be made much simpler with
a clear, well-reasoned Supreme Court decision mapping
out exactly what the national security exception to prior
restraint entails today. Until the Court issues such a decision, the outcome of a media challenge to governmental
prior restraint of a television network's attempt to broadcast controversial remote-sensing imagery remains unpredictable. The case law does foretell that any such decision
will be fact sensitive as well as sensitive to the ideological
makeup of the Court. Only time will tell, if ever.
177 Henry Allen, The Gulf Between Media and Military, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991,
at D I (80% of the American people in the Gulf War approved of military restrictions on the media's reporting of the War, and 60% said they thought there
should be more restrictions); Alex S. Jones, Poll Backs Control of News, N.Y. TiMES,
Jan. 31, 1991, at C24) (79% of Americans in the Gulf War viewed military censorship as a good idea, and 59% said they only had a fair amount of confidence that
the media reported the War in an accurate manner, hardly a compelling vote of
confidence for the press).
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IMPENDING CONFLICT: MILITARY/MEDIA
TENSION AND THE CATALYST OF
REMOTE-SENSING TECHNOLOGY
GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT LOOMING MILITARY/

MEDIA CONFLICT

The point has been made that the military/media relationship currently stands on shaky ground. If the media
in the near future can access Landsat or Spot imagery with
resolution of five meters or less, or even more provocatively have its own Mediasat with similar resolution, conflict between the military and the media over a media right
to gather news in certain global regions and a military
right to impose prior restraint over broadcast of certain
imagery is almost inevitable. The two entities' agendas do
not run parallel; for the military, the goal must be to preserve national security at all costs, and it will view this aim
best served by stifling any publication or broadcast which
may adversely affect national security. 78 The media on
the other hand will view its right to gather news to be limited, if at all, only by the narrowest of exceptions, and will
assert that in almost every case it should be able to access
news and not be subjected to military imposition of prior
restraint.179
B.

TRANSFER OF LANDSAT OVERSIGHT

One development which hinders potential cooperation
or compromise on remote-sensing access levels is the recent transfer of governmental oversight of the Landsat
program from a branch of the Commerce Department,
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to the Defense Department and
NASA.' 8 0 Cynical media observers of the Landsat/Eosat
program would equate this development with the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse. The Assistant Air Force
generally Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1309; Thomas, supra note 62.
See generally Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
'80 Congress Considers, supra note 14, at 18; Reimer, supra note 4, at 322.
78 See

':
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Secretary for Space attempted to allay such concerns by
claiming that the military would only seek a delay in Landsat imagery release in wartime, but conjectures by administration officials as to future Landsat policies for the
release of satellite imagery seem rather pointless. 8 ' Any
military oversight of Landsat will become irrelevant for
the media anyway if it launches its own Mediasat. If the
media does so, several options for government inhibition
of such are apparent: the government could limit (1) the
resolution of the satellite, (2) the images the satellite can
8 2
collect, or (3) the images the media might disseminate.
Any of the above limitations would meet media resistance.
As discussed earlier, the fast-developing foreign commercial market for remote-sensing presents one outside
factor which could make a domestic remote-sensing dispute redundant. 8 3 Remote-sensing abroad continues to
develop at an astonishing rate, and if the media can acquire foreign imagery that it is precluded from accessing
at home in a timely fashion, it destroys the utility of any
domestic regulation. The difficulty in any such regulation
is exemplified by the Russians, currently marketing two
meter resolution imagery. By marketing their imagery,
the Russians make it arduous to justify regulation of any
domestic imagery with lower resolution capabilities. 4
However, it is hard to predict whether foreign imagery
with such resolution will become available for broadcast
in a rapid enough manner to threaten national security in
a substantive sense anytime in the near future. 8 5 Additionally, even if such imagery were to develop, it is hard to
imagine the U.S. Government not anticipating that possibility by entering into a treaty with the country in question
to limit the foreign remote-sensing satellite's access to
I'l
1'1
'
',

Congress Considers, supra note 14, at 18.
OTA Memorandum, supra note 19, at 35.
See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
Jones, supra note 4, at D1.

ld. Currently, two meter Russian imagery is only available after a forty-five
I"'
day waiting period, presumably far too long a time to have any consequentially
negative effect on national security in almost all cases. Id. at D4.
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sensitive image gathering regions of the globe. Although
technological advancements in remote-sensing satellites
abroad could make the constitutional issues presented
here irrelevant, it is doubtful this will occur. The lack of
access to certain imagery, the lack of cooperation from
foreign governments, the time constraints on the utility of
imagery for the media, and the threat of Espionage Act
sanctions for breaches of U.S. national security make media use of potentially destructive imagery from overseas as
doubtful as the use of the same sort of domestic imagery.
Progression of foreign imagery technology probably will
not provide an easy escape from this ongoing constitutional debate.
VIII.

PROPOSALS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Although it seems inevitable that the first attempt by
the military to restrict or forbid media access to certain
satellite imagery will result in a constitutionally based
conflict over remote-sensing, alternatives are available. A
sensible proposal would be to form an oversight board to
rule on any conflicts over imagery access. 186 The board
would be made up of: (1) Executive Branch representation (the Defense Department, the State Department, the
Commerce Department, the White House and NASA), (2)
congressional representation from both the House and
Senate, (3) media representation from both the print and
television mediums, and finally, (4) private sector representation from entities marketing the imagery and involved in the industry overall. The board would
necessarily be composed of members available for last
minute emergency meetings, and a quorum should be
16 For similar suggestions, see Frieden, supra note 6, at 190-93; Reimer, supra
note 4, at 349; Don Sneed & Kyu Ho Youm, First Amendment Rights in Space: An
"Emerging" ConstitutionalIssue, 11 COMM. AND THE LAW 45, 50 (1989). The prob-

lem with oversight boards and compromise suggestions is that at this point, they
have been casually addressed and rarely given more than a surface level perusal.
Hopefully, the different alternatives to conflict avoidance over remote-sensing will
be debated in a more substantive manner in the near future. This article attempts
to make a humble beginning in that direction.
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made up of two-thirds of the board members. Decisions
by the board could only be superseded by direct presidential intervention. The clear difficulty with this proposal
rests with the timing necessary to impart such a board's
decisions with relevance and applicability. Due to most
remote-sensing imagery becoming redundant for media
purposes within the span of a single day, 8

7

the odds are

long of a controversy being recognized and a board actually meeting within that time frame. However, if such a
framework can be implemented, a board could facilitate
the avoidance of litigation. In the alternative if the board
simply cannot meet on a time frame quite that constrictive, it could issue opinions after the fact, generating guidance so that if the military does overstep its regulatory
powers the overstep will be corrected immediately.
A second proposal also involves a board, but with dramatically different member composition. The board
would be composed of participants from the legal profession, including judges, attorneys, and legal scholars. The
board's purpose would be not so much to rule on media
use of imagery under potentially unreasonable time constraints, but to analyze any restricted imagery after the
fact and issue advisory opinions as to whether the board
believes the government exercised a valid constitutional
prior restraint, or whether the restraint was illegitimate
and a violation of the prior restraint doctrine (similar to
the latter half of the first proposal above). The effectiveness of such a system would only become apparent after
the board issued several advisory opinions, when observers could judge whether the government has followed the
board's recommendations and released imagery the board
viewed as disseminative under the prior restraint doctrine. If the government appears to be ignoring the
board, litigation over a particular restrained image would
probably ensue soon thereafter.
A third proposal would be to simply allow the media to
7 OTA Memorandum, supra note 19, at 10.
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exercise self-restraint in their utilization of imagery from a
commercial satellite or from a Mediasat.18 The media
historically has a fairly good record of self-restraint from
publication of images or stories which threaten American
lives or national security. 8 9 However, considering the
current strain and lack of trust between military and media, this proposal does not present a likely candidate for
implementation. 90
Finally, since few satellite images actually threaten or
potentially threaten national security, it might be best to
leave the status quo as is, wait for conflict to arise, and
hope that the Supreme Court issues an opinion which
clarifies the whole situation. With the law inconclusive in
regard to news gathering and prior restraint doctrinal exceptions,' 9 ' this may stand out as the best possibility of
all. In addition to this, a panel of legal scholars could issue a body of commentary on the whole situation, to perhaps provide the Court with a starting point from which
to attack the issue in an actual dispute. The problem rests
in uncertainty; no one knows when such a case might develop, and while everyone involved in the controversy
bides time, the law remains nebulous and potential violations of media rights could arise. The board consisting of
relevant interested parties presents the best possibility;
optimistically, a method for obtaining and issuing board
rulings in a timely manner could be developed after a
board is actually formed to deal with this issue. Otherwise
litigation, hopefully rising to the Supreme Court level,
will be the vehicle most likely to assist in clarifying the
issue.
i' Frieden, supra note 6, at 192.

Homonoff, supra note 73, at 382. Besides the security violations, or perceived violations in the Korean War discussed in note 82, the media has only on
rare occasions been even accused of threatening national security in wartime with
improper disclosures.
-o A prime illustration of continuing tension is the uproar over the media's
visible role in the landing of U.S. marines on the beaches of Somalia in late 1992.
Much less attention would have been paid to the media's involvement in the landing if the military and media strains were not so evident.
19, See generally supra notes 123-77 and accompanying text.
"9
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FINAL THOUGHTS

The problem inherent in the dilemma over remotesensing is simple: two vital elements of our national
fabric have collided with each other. The media's right to
gather information to empower and maintain a well-informed public has to be a well-protected one in our society. A free press separates us from the vast majority of
the world's nations, and has so separated us for centuries.
An unlimited media right to gather information, however,
must at times conflict with the more vital national interest
in preserving our way of life, defending American borders, preserving the peace, and protecting the young men
and women in the government's service from the release
of information which could threaten their lives, and even
more seriously, threaten the interests of their country.
Media news gathering and information distribution cannot harmoniously coexist with the government's sworn
duty to preserve national security and further the national
interest at all costs. Fortunately, true national security issues arise infrequently, offering hope that these two interests will not conflict except intermittently. Justice
Stewart's opinion in the New York Times case indicates that
restrictions on remote-sensing imagery would be utilized
only to prevent direct, immediate and irreparable damage
to the U.S. government or its people. 192 No one wants to
see the government overstep its regulatory power in the
area of remote-sensing technology, and at the same time
no one wants to see information damaging to national security released by negligent or irresponsible media members. Middle ground on this issue can be found. It will
chiefly require the cooperation and commitment of the
military and media to a system where only under the gravest of circumstances will national security interests
threaten to encroach on remote-sensing imagery distribution. In those instances where there is a dispute over potential distribution, an agreed upon, objective system for
1112New

York Times, 403 U.S. at 730; Reimer, supra note 4, at 348.
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arbitration already exists to manage the dispute. As Luc
Frieden eloquently puts it:
The Orwellian threat of "Big Brother," whether it comes
from a public or private source, can be avoided if the media are aware of their increasing power and consequent
social responsiblility, and if they exercise self-restraint and
responsible judgment regarding information that can create irreparable harm to a person or to a state. 93
An addition should be made to Frieden's statement: if
a dispute over satellite imagery restraint develops and an
arbitrational body is appointed to decide the issue, the
President of the United States must be able to exercise
veto power over any decisions made by the arbitrational
body concerning a national security dispute, to retain Executive Branch autonomy over such issues. Presidential
power would be a last resort, and not something the President would utilize when his Secretary of Defense has a
simple dispute with the media. With the high level of discretion the Executive Branch possesses under the Landsat
Act and the subsequent regulations to license and regulate commercial remote-sensing activity. 94 Close attention must be paid by such an arbitrational body to
Executive Branch actions. Close scrutiny prevents the Defense Department or any other Executive Branch body
from abusing its stewardship of the licensing or regulatory process.
The struggle over uninhibited media access to remotesensing technology should not overshadow the multifaceted, dramatic potential the technology holds for increasing information flow, furthering the level of
understanding of our planet and its resources, and in general improving the quality of life through technological
advancement. Worldwide revenues from commercial remote-sensing activities in toto approached one hundred
million recently,' 95 and the industry continues to grow at
'." Frieden, supra note 6, at 192.
11:5

See generally 15 C.F.R. § 960.1-16 (1992); 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4292 (1993).
Asker, supra note 4, at 46.
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a rate that would make Wall Street portfolio managers
swoon, twenty to thirty percent a year. 96 Although the
conflict appears to be with us for the near future, when
considering how dramatically the benefits of the technology outweigh the detriments, a solution appears inevitable. The military and media will establish a modus
vivendi with each other at some point in regard to remotesensing out of necessity. The stakes are too high and the
alternatives too costly for any other result. Whether such
a relationship develops voluntarily between the parties or
under judicial compulsion, possibly from the Supreme
Court itself, remains a question only the passage of time
will answer.

196Id. Although reliable estimates are not available, some have predicted that
by the year 2000, remote-sensing could generate several billion dollars a year in
revenue. DeSaussure, supra note 6, at 352 (citing Remote Sensing: New Applications
Gain Acceptance, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 15, 1988, at 63).
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